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Sherman Act—Action for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act—Injury by Reason of Conspiracy of Automobile Manu-
facturers to Restrain Development of Emission-Control Devices
—In re Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litiga.
tion Involving Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment.'
—Plaintiffs, a collection of private individuals, cities and states, brought
individual and class actions against General Motors, Chrysler, Ford,
American Motors and the Automobile Manufacturers Association, al-
leging violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 2 and petitioning the
court for treble damages recovery under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.'
The various complaints' purported to represent a number of interests
including all individuals within the United States, all farmers within
the United States, all individuals within certain states and their polit-
ical subdivisions, and all persons sustaining damage to their real or
personal property and business through air pollution.' These plaintiffs,
whose causes of action were consolidated for purposes of pre-trial
expedition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407,° alleged that the defendants
combined or conspired to eliminate all competition among themselves
in the research, development, manufacture, installation and publicity
of emission-control devices on motor vehicles, and that the defendants,
through cross-licensing arrangements, collectively agreed to limit the
purchase price of patent rights developed by outside interests.'
1 5 TRADE Rao. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) if 73,318, at 89,254 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1970)
[hereinafter cited as In re Motor Vehicle Pollution]. The district court also filed an
opinion on the class action, see 5 TRADE RED. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) f 73,317, at 89,251
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1970).
2 15 U.S.C. §U 1-7 (1964).
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), superceding Sherman Act § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890). Section
7 of the Sherman Act was repealed in 1955, ch. 283, $1 3, 69 Stat. 283 (1955).
4 The respective complaints and plaintiffs will hereinafter be referred to by names
of the primary plaintiffs.
5 See In re Motor Vehicle Pollution at 89,252.
See note 1 supra. The instant action represents a unification of multiple actions
transferred to the District Court for the Central District of California in order
to facilitate multidistrict litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. .. .
(b) Such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall be conducted
by a judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned by the judicial
pane! on multidistrict litigation. • . .
7 The history of this action can be traced to January 10, 1969 when the Attorney
General filed a complaint against these same defendants, alleging substantially the same
antitrust violations as these plaintiffs. 6 TRADE REG. REP. (Case 2037) If 45,069 (CD.
Cal. January 10, 1969). On October 29, 1969, a consent decree was entered whereby the
defendants were enjoined and restrained from engaging in the conspiratorial activity
alleged in the government's complaint. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, CCH
1969 TRADE CASES ¶ 72,907 (CD. Cal. October 29, 1969).
The plaintiffs in the instant case brought this action only because they were refused
intervention in the government's action. 5 TRADE REC. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,070
(C.D. Cal. November 7, 1969). There the petitioners prayed for intervention as a matter
of right under Rule 24(b) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. They apparently hoped to have the
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The defendants proceeded to attack each of the class actions for
failure to meet the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedures because of an absence of questions of law and fact
common to the class and predominating over questions involving only
its individual members.° Identifying conspiracy, impact and damage
as the determinable issues, the court ruled that a conspiracy to impede
development of equipment that would substantially prevent biospheric
pollution is a question common to all classes and actions, and thus
requires only singular litigation." However, the issue of the uniquely
injurious impact of the conspiracy was deemed as multifarious as the
various injuries sustained by the public itself. Consequently, impact
did not constitute a question of fact common to the classes represented
in certain of the complaints, and precluded those plaintiffs from main-
taining class actions on behalf of all "citizens of the United States"
and "all residents."" Exemplifying where impact would be common
to such a general class, the court referred to several cases" in which
the character of the antitrust violation—price fixing—so defined the
impact and the affected public sector, that the two were nearly synon-
ymous." Thus, given the inflated market price, every occasion of
purchase of the defendant's product or products was equally the occa-
sion of a determinable injury.
Conceding that the impact of smog could inflict varying degrees
of injury upon the crops, flora and fauna in a state, political subdivi-
sion, public corporation or public authority, the court ruled that com-
mon issues of law and fact do inhere in the properly represented
classes in the complaints submitted by several states." However, the
consent decree set aside and subsequently force a trial on the claims, which, If successful,
would have served as a sound basis for their treble damages actions. Alternatively, they
sought to accomplish the same objective by insertion of an admission of liability, or
"asphalt clause." Id. at 88,204 n.5. Predictably enough, the defendants refused to consent
to such a provision. Relying upon United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp.
430 (C.D. Cal. 1967), the court ruled that the intervenors were not entitled to permissive
intervention when such would preclude the entry of a consent decree. The court assumed
the decree to be enforceable, productive of immediate benefits, and obviative of pro-
tracted trial proceedings and risk of loss. However, a provision was entered into the
decree requiring that the transcript and all evidence of the dismissed grand jury pro-
ceeding be impounded by the Department of Justice, to be obtainable by private parties
through subpoena or other means upon a showing of good cause. Id. at 88,205.
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b) (3).
0 See In re Motor Vehicle Pollution at 89,252-253.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am, Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa.
1968); Illinois v. Harper & Rowe Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (ND. III. 1969); In
re Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation Involving Water
Meters, 304 F. Supp. 873 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Lit. 1969),
13
 "If you qualify as a 'buyer' of the commodity in question the liability—damage
Issues—except as to amount of damage—lend themselves to common determination." In
re Motor Vehicle Pollution at 89,253.
14 Id. at 89,254.
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court also ruled that the government entities who sued for damages
on behalf of citizens within their respective jurisdictions could not
qualify as representatives in this class action since they were not
themselves members of the class of citizens or residents aggrieved."
Representation of government agencies as a class, their own repre-
sentative to be selected later, was permitted. Furthermore, the states
were allowed to sue in a parens patriae capacity for damage to their
economic interests, provided the suit was not an artifice for the re-
covery of individual citizen claims." Therefore, under the require-
ment that in a class action representatives be members of their class,
the respective states, their political subdivisions and agencies, and
farmers are the only classes that can be properly represented in the
instant case.
The thrust of the defendants' motion to dismiss, however, was
their assertion that the absence of a commercial relationship between
the parties precluded the plaintiffs from any award of damages.
HELD: that for purposes of the motion to dismiss the court is com-
pelled to assume the injury alleged' 7 and to afford the plaintiffs, unless
there be failure of proof, opportunity to remedy the alleged injury."
Given both the evolving character of interpretation of Section 4 of
the Clayton Act and the recognition of the injury alleged in this suit
as unprecedented, this casenote will examine the complaint in light of
antitrust precedents and the ruling on the motion to dismiss.
Although the common law declared illegal and unenforceable con-
tracts and combinations which restrained trade and competition, the
consequent restraints were subject to no penalty, and any injury in-
15 Id.
16 See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co. of Calif., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969).
17 In re Motor Vehicle Pollution at 89,255, citing Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc.,
380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967) and Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d
420 (3rd Cir. 1968).
18 In re Motor Vehicle Pollution at 82,256. In addition, the defendants moved to
dismiss the Handy complaint by an attack on Count II, which alleged violation of
"'plaintiffs' right to clean air and to a safe and healthy environment, free from the
contaminants and pollutants which have resulted, and continue to result, from the
operation of gasoline vehicles, and the use therein of gasoline, which vehicles and gaso-
line were, and still are, manufactured, distributed and sold by the defendants . . . ."
Handy claimed that these rights were protected by the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Four-
teenth Amendments and by the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1988 (1964). The
court, however, declined to rule that private corporations, even though massive in
stature, have the function of public utilities or government agencies. Any legal injuries
they inflict are exclusively private, and cannot give rise to an action under constitutional
or statutory protection.
The defendants also attacked the petition for injunctive relief in 14 of the 15 com-
plaints. Citing the function of transferee cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1407, the court
ruled that the prayer for relief would not impair expedition of the pre-trial proceedings,
and, moreover, that an attack upon the prayer during the pre-trial stage was both pre-
mature and presumptive that the plaintiffs would be unable to introduce evidentiary need
for further injunctive relief.
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curred was not actionable." Therefore, in order to afford the public
protection from the injurious effects of restraints on commerce, legis-
lation at the turn of the century incorporated into the prohibitory
language of the Sherman and Clayton Acts the common law concept
of unlawful restraints issuing from any combination, conspiracy, con-
tract or agreement. 2° Furthermore, through Section T of the Sherman
Act and later Section 4 of the Clayton Act, Congress manifested its
intent that the Acts be self-enforcing by encouraging private litigation
through a treble damages incentive." Seemingly, the conditions that
the private plaintiff had to allege for standing to sue under section 4
were clearly specified therein: (1) one or more antitrust violations;
(2) injury to business or property; and (3) "by reason of" causation
between the violation and the injury." However, this simple language
has been the genesis of a body of decisional law whose statutory in-
terpretation is still far from a settled statement of law.
In a proceeding under section 4 the plaintiff must allege the
existence of a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce." The initial determination must then be made as
to whether the activity is illegal on its face by application of the "per
se rule," or whether it necessitates examination of circumstances and
consequences by application of the "rule of reason." The "per se rule"
recognizes that there are forms of conduct that intrinsically restrain
free and open competition irrespective of any extraneous considera-
tions such as the volume and location of trade, the intent of the pro-
moters, or any projected socio-economic benefits." Consequently,
price-fixing, market division, group boycotts and tying arrangements
10 For a concise and historically well-grounded articulation of the scope and intended




 Nevertheless, this intent to establish a force of litigants ancillary to the govern-
ment, was given little substantiation during the first 50 years of the Sherman Act when
only 13 of 175 actions were successful. Note, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 130, 138 (1950). Since
World War II, however, private antitrust litigation has proliferated, but usually only
pursuant to action initiated by the government. Cf. Comment, 61 Yale L.J. 1010, 1056-
062 (1952); Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Action, 4
Antitrust Bull. 5 (1959); and Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The
Robinson-Patman Experience, 30 Geo. Wash, L. Rev. 181 (1961).
22 I5 U.S.C. § 15:
Suits by persons injured; amount of recovery. Any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws may sue . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
23
 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964): "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States .. .
is declared to be illegal."
24 See, e.g., Justice Mack in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958). Cf. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Fortner Enterprises v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969).
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have traditionally been held to be per se violations of antitrust law."
If, however, the illegal conduct is not susceptible to application of the
"per se rule," the court applies the second test, the "rule of reason."
This requires judicial examination and evaluation of the effects of the
conduct to determine if there is present any unreasonable restraint
of trade and competition." However, given the voluminous investiga-
tive burden and economic analysis that the rule of reason test imposes
upon the court, it has been advanced that the showing for availability
of the "per se rule" has been restricted, and that its extension into
areas other than flagrant violations is being judicially contemplated."
There should be a strong probability, therefore, that since conduct like
price-fixing, market division, group boycotts and tying arrangements
—conduct which at least permits the manufacture and sale of the
product, albeit at an inflated price—has been declared illegal," a
fortiori, conduct which precludes the distribution, or even research,
of a product will be a per se violation. Clearly, therefore, it would
appear that if the plaintiffs in In re Motor Vehicle Pollution can affir-
matively demonstrate that the automotive industry and its trade asso-
ciation have conspired to impair the research, manufacture and
installation of emission-control devices, the courts should apply the
"per se rule" and decide that such activity constitutes a flagrant viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The fact that the defendants
are patentees who are denying to the general public the availability of
an invention whose preventive benefits are of incalculable value to
public health care should be an additional factor in compelling the
courts to apply the "per se rule." Even if a court believes it possible
to analyze the violation in purely economic terms a cogent argument
still remains. In a system of putatively free enterprise, the patent sys-
tem and its attendant incentive to invent can remain viable only if
there is a public demand for an invention and a consequent supply of
that demand. Should this objective be defeated by deliberate nonpro-
duction or dilatory production of an invention, then antitrust law
should become operative."
25 The Per Se Rule, Report of the Special Subcommittee of the Sherman Act Com-
mittee, 38 ABA Antitrust L.J. 731 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Special
Subcommittee]. Cf. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price-Fixing and
Market Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775 (1965).
25
 Cf. Standard OH Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 238 (1918). But see the dissent
of Louis B. Schwartz in the Report of the Attorney General's Nat. Comm, to Study the
Antitrust Laws, at 390 (1955).
27 Report of the Special Subcommittee, supra note 25, at 783-804, particularly
799-801.
28 See note 25 supra.
29 Report of the Attorney General's Nat. Comm. to Study the Antitrust Laws, at
230:
Appraising the antitrust significance of non-use, courts have been quick to
separate reasonable justification from design to restrain trade. For example,
agreements among patentees not to use patented inventions are recognized in
purpose and effect as devices to impede competitors and foreclose their competi-
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The possibility does nevertheless remain that courts will not apply
the per se rule since the defendants will argue that technological and
economic factors, and not profit motivation or deliberate elimination
of competition, have prevented the development and installation of
emission-control devices. An application of the per se rule would,
therefore, be an inequitable and unwarranted extension of this test.
This apologia has apparently been grounded in assertions alleging ab-
sence of "technological feasibility' and "irreparable damage to the
American economy."" Supposedly this damage would occur if auto-
mobile manufacturers were compelled to install emission-control equip-
ment that would reduce emissions in 1975 by ninety percent from 1970
levels of contamination." But even if the courts should apply the
rule of reason test the possibility should be remote that they could
convince themselves that these corporate mastodons, possessing vast
resources in a society that has witnessed numerous technological
achievements, have been and will continue to be justifiably unable to
produce emission-control equipment." Equally remote should be the
possibility that the courts would succumb to those contentions pro-
jecting damage to the economy, unless damage to life and to the bio-
sphere is considered to be of lesser value.
However, the existence alone of an antitrust violation, no matter
how egregious, will not entitle a plaintiff to a private cause of action
since Section 4 of the Clayton Act predicates the cause of action upon
legal injury, that is, the fact of damage to business or property, and
Lion. Contracts, combinations or conspiracies for non-use of patented inventions
to 'fence in' a technology or to 'block' a competing technology are clearly un-
reasonable per se antitrust violations.
See particularly Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale and Towne Mfg. Co., 166 F. 555 (D. Mass.
1909) and Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 146 F.2d
941, 944-46 (9th Cir. 1945), and especially at 952 regarding loss of a patent right be-
cause of deliberate withholding of use of an invention from the public.
so Ford Motor Company's Position on the Main Issues of Senator Muskie's Sub-
committee's Amended Clean Air Act, Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466 and S. 3546 Before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the ,Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2nd
Sess., pt. 5, at 1604 (1910) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
al 1970 Hearings, supra note 30, at 1608, Statement by L.A. Iacocca, Executive
Vice President, Ford Motor Co., Concerning Pending Senate Changes to the Clean .ir
Act, September 9, 1970.
82
 Cf. the proposed National Air Quality Standards Act of 1970, H.R. 17255, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. § 202(b)(1) (1970);
Beginning with model year 1975 or after January 1, 1975, any new light duty
vehicle or any new light duty vehicle engine, as determined by the Secretary,
shall be required, for purposes of certification under this Act, to meet emission
standards established by the Secretary for those air pollution agents for which
emission standards were in effect prior to the date of enactment of the National
Air Quality Standards Act of 1970, which at a minimum, shall represent a 90
per centum reduction from allowable emissions for 1970 model year vehicles or
engines.
For an exhaustive analysis of the Act, see Comment, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 570
(1971).
as See notes 30 and 31 supra.
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not on the violation itself." Consequently, the plaintiff, or class of
plaintiffs, must allege and prove a specific form of injury personal
to him and distinguishable from that incurred by the general public:
Allegation of the specific injury suffered by plaintiff differing
from that sustained by it as a member of the community is
essential. The manner, nature, character and extent of the in-
jury sustained and the facts from which injury accrues and
upon which damages may be assessed as well as those with
regard to the effect of the alleged violation upon plaintiff's
business must be pleaded."
The courts have attached no special significance to "business or prop-
erty" under section 4 and have interpreted the phrase simply to mean
a "commercial or industrial enterprise or establishment."' Within
this purview, therefore, it appears that both public and private plain-
tiffs in the instant case will have to prove with sufficient particularity
injury to their business or property. For example, claimants repre-
senting. cities, governmental bodies or states, individually and in a
parens patriae capacity, could show that their water and wildlife re-
sources, public buildings, and potential for economic growth have
sustained damage. Similarly, the complaint representing farmers as
an injured class could show injury to their property in the form of
diminution of land value, acreage yield or quality of crops. In a less
tangible manner perhaps, private plaintiffs might show that their re-
spective businesses have incurred injury in the form of impairment of
profitable employee production. The obvious defense to these allega-
tions of injury will simply be that they are too speculative to admit
recovery. However, a distinction must be drawn between the fact of
damage and the extent or amount of damage. Although courts at one
time denied recovery for damages that were in any measure specula-
tive, they now recognize proof of some injury and causative violation
sufficient to permit the jury to infer the extent and amount of damages,
especially where the defendant himself, by the character of his viola-
34 See Beagle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
743 (1944); Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass.), aff'd,
272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959).
85 Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d at 881. See also Blaski v. Inland Steel Co., 271 F.2d
853 (7th Cir. 1959); United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954). Until 1957
the plaintiff also had the burden of proving public injury as well. But Radovich v.
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957), held that Congress had de-
termined what activities constituted public harm and that, since public injury can be
assumed to exist in some manner in every violation, the plaintiff should not have this
additional burden. Cf. also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co.,
364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
36 Image and Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D.
Mass. 1956); Broadcasters, Inc. v. Morristown Broadcasting Corp., 185 F. Supp 641
(D. N.J. 1960). Cf. also Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942),
which extends the definition of business or property to include employment or occupa-
tion which is a source of income.
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tion, has rendered the task of accurate determination difficult or
impossible."
Once an antitrust violation and injury have been established, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving a causal relationship between them
as required in the "by reason of" language of section 4.' 8
 The quantum
of proof required to establish this fact of causation has been the
subject of no little decisional controversy. Some courts have held that
the proof should meet the test of preponderance of the evidence or
even a test requiring some measure of certainty.'" The Supreme Court
has held that if a reasonable inference can be drawn from the facts
alleged that the forbidden conduct caused the injury, the question of
requisite causation is one for the jury." However, the defendant's
illegal conduct need not be the exclusive cause of the injury, but only
a substantial factor or material cause 4 1
 Since the strict tests of pre-
ponderance or certainty contain degrees of flexibility that vary in each
circumstance
, 
it is difficult to predict the consequences of their applica-
tion in In re Motor Vehicle Pollution. Clearly the evidence of scientific
and commercial data adduced by the plaintiffs would have to show
substantial and material causation attributable to the defendant's
conduct, and not to any other contributory forces. However, since the
37
 Cf. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562
(1931):
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but there
was none as to the fact of damage; and there is a clear distinction between the
measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner has sustained
some damage and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the
amount.
See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Wolfe v. National
Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 433 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955); Flinkote Co. v.
Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
88
 Sec note 22 supra.
88
 See Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block St Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 957
(10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960) ("preponderance of the evidence") ;
Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957)
("reasonable probability"); Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., 172 F.2d 37,
43 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949) ("fair degree of certainty"). Cf. also
Talon, Inc. v. Union Slide Fastener, Inc., 266 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 1959) and E.V.
Prentice Mach. Co. v. Associated Plywood Mills, Inc., 252 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.),
tett denied, 356 U.S. 951 (1958).
40
 See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 246 (1946); Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). Cf. Poller v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962), where the Court expressed strong
disfavor against summary proceedings in antitrust litigation: "We believe that summary
procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and
intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and
hostile witnesses thicken the plot."
41
 See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Switzer Bros.,
Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39, 47 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 851 (1962); E.V.
Prentice Mach. Co. v. Associated Plywood Mills, Inc., 252 F.2d 473, 479 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 951 (1958); and Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., — F.2d —
(2d Cir. 1969).
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judicial trend views such summary judgments with disapprobation,"
it would appear likely that the courts in accord with precedent would
allow reasonable men to infer from proof of an antitrust violation and
subsequent loss, that the defendants' conduct is a substantial factor or
a material cause of the injury. In order to defeat any finding that
their illegal conduct has been a causative factor, the automobile man-
ufacturers will probably produce evidence that the causative con-
tributors to air pollution are multiple, and that their own responsibility
for such pollution is demonstrably neither a. dominant nor a substan-
tial cause. However, since it is well established that a defendant's
violative activity need not be the sole cause of an injury," and that
emissions from motor vehicles contribute decidedly to environmental
contamination," the trier of fact could find that the defendants' con-
spiracy to restrain the availability of emission-control devices is a
substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' injury.
Even if a plaintiff proves that he was injured in his business or
property by reason of the defendants' antitrust misconduct, the final
and crucial showing must be "directness of injury. 74" To preserve his
standing to sue under this judicially constructed touchstone, the plain-
tiff must show that his injury is non-derivative, affecting him as a
direct competitor of the defendant. This test of privity or direct re-
lations was first enunciated in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.," which
held that a stockholder-creditor of a company damaged by the de-
fendant's illegal conduct could not bring a cause of action under section 4
because of the absence of privity with the defendant. As in any other
derivative action the requisite standing to sue rests with the "directly"
injured party," not with a party whose injury is "indirect, remote and
42 See note 40 supra.
42 See note 41 supra.
44 See 1970 Hearings, supra note 30, at 1639. See also Id. at 1656-659, the letter
from Senator Gaylord Nelson, member of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, to
Jennings Randolph, Chairman, Senate Public Works Comm. on results of the 1970
Clean Air Car Race where college students, modifying an internal combustion engine
and employing non-leaded fuels, surpassed the proposed 1975 federal standards, a goal
the automotive industry pleads it cannot meet until 1980.
45 SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166, 168 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 943 (1969); Productive Inventions v. Trico Products Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679
(2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956); Conference of Studio Unions v.
Lam's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952); Nation-
wide Auto Appraiser Serv. Inc. v. Association of Casualty and Surety Co., 382 F.2d
925, 929 (10th Cir. 1967); Snow Crest Beverages,' Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp.
907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956); Valasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Billy Baxter, Inc., v. Coca-Cola Co.,
F.2d — (2d Cir. 1970).
45 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
47 Consequently, several classes of would-be plaintiffs have been denied standing
to sue under this requirement. See, e.g., Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Asso-
ciation of Casualty and Surety Co., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967) (franchisors); Valasco
Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962) (suppliers to an
injured corporation); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1969)
and Productive Inventions v. Trico Products Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955) (patent
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consequential!'" Even if the plaintiff suffers injury as a result of the
defendant's conduct, that injury is termed "indirect" if there is pres-
ent an intermediate person who has also sustained injury. The thrust
of the defendants' motion to dismiss, the allegation of an absence of
any "commercial relationship" 49 between the parties, apparently an-
ticipates the application of this "direct relations" talisman. For even if
the plaintiffs can show a causal link between the antitrust violation
and the injury to their business or property, it must be admitted that
the traditionally defined direct commercial and competitive relation-
ship to the automotive manufacturers is possessed only by those parties
whose business involves the research, development or sale of automo-
tive emission-control devices. The possibility exists that the, plaintiffs
could successfully assert privity by claiming to be purchasers of the
defendants' product. Here, however, the courts could rule that this
privity characterizes only vendors and vendees," and that it is not the
privity required for an antitrust recovery. Again, if the plaintiffs are
to have the required direct relationship to the defendants, as defined
in Loeb,5' they must themselves be engaged in the same commercially
competitive activity. It will be difficult for the plaintiffs in In re Motor
Vehicle Pollution to advance such a claim. Although it is encouraging
to note that the court in the pre-trial proceedings did not profess ad-
herence to any legalistic atavism,' it is likely that should the court
apply the impacted criterion of "direct relations" it will hold that the
plaintiff's injury is indirect. Moreover, since "directness" is a test
determinative of legal injury, a court ruling that the legal injury is
insufficient due to indirectness will preclude submission to the jury
even if a reasonable inference of causation could be drawn.
Other courts, while retaining the "directness of injury" test, have
nevertheless adopted a more flexible standard of proof of such direct-
ness. They hold that standing to sue is fulfilled if the plaintiff, even if
not in a relationship of privity or direct competition, can show himself
within the target area, that is, "that area of the economy which is
threatened by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular
licensors suing for lost royalties because of injury to licensee) ; Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's,
Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956) and Lieberthal v. North
Country Lanes, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd on other grounds, 332 F.2d
269 (2d Cir. 1964) (lessors and landlords). But see Congress Building v. Loew's, Inc., 246
F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957) (where lessee is party to the violation).
48 183 F. at 109.
40 See In re Motor Vehicle Pollution at 89,255.
50 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motors Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
51 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
52 In re Motor Vehicle Pollution at 89,256:
We are now concerned with the phrase "injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" in light of the allegations
of these complaints, rather than the traditional, legalistic approach defined by
the cases cited by defendants in their motion to dismiss. Each of the plaintiffs
allege injury to their respective business or property by reason of antitrust viola-
lations of the defendants.
695
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
industry."" It is conceivable, therefore, that a court could allow a
reasonable inference to be drawn that the plaintiffs herein were in the
target area of the automotive manufacturers' illegal activity, and
thereby suffered direct injury to their business or property. The de-
fendants may disclaim any attempt to inflict such injury, but fact
analysis could prove that the impact of their illegal restraints upon
emission-control equipment hit the economic target of the plaintiffs'
business and property and, in effect, marked the plaintiffs as the prin-
cipal victims of the defendants' violations.
But the cases which apply the "target area" label," albeit a less
constrictive approach than privity, invariably involve plaintiffs who
have some commercial relationship to the affected competitive market.
And even in these cases standing to sue has been denied. For example,
in Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co." the plaintiff-franchisor pur-
chased federally registered trademarks and secret carbonated beverage
extracts, and then sold them to franchisee-bottlers who manufactured
and distributed them, remitting royalties to the franchisor. But Billy
Baxter, Inc. did not merely license secret trade information and then
passively collect royalties. In its role of trademark owner, responsible
to the purchasing public for product quality, the licensor actively
exercised "quality control" by reserving to itself the supervisory right
to inspect and direct the bottling practices and distribution perform-
ances of its licensees. When the defendant beverage manufacturers
and licensors of bottlers allegedly engaged in market division and of-
fered discriminatory price concessions to the plaintiff's customers in
order to exclude his products from the market, the plaintiff sought
treble damages under section 4. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the
plaintiff had no standing to sue because his role as franchisor separated
him from the actual production-distribution market. Therefore, be was
not within the target area which received the primary impact of the
violations." Thus, a plaintiff whose relationship to the affected com-
petitive market was more than merely tenuous was denied standing
to sue. Given, therefore, the decisional interpretation of "target area"
58 Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). See also Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221
F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955); Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc.,
368 F.2d 679, 688-89 (8th Cir. 1966); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v.
Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 418 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Hoopes v.
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967).
54 See cases cited in note 53 supra.
65 	F.2d — (2d Cir. 1970).
56 But see the dissent of Judge Waterman who argues persuasively that Billy
Baxter, Inc. was directly aimed at and directly bit by the alleged violation. Since the
allegations assert that the defendants' objective was to eliminate, not the bottling in-
dustry, but Billy Baxter products, the bottlers are only incidentally bit. Although they
are harmed to the extent that they are no longer able to produce and market Billy
Baxter brand-name products, a market for bottling—perhaps now even the defendants'
products—can still he in demand. But the complete extermination of Billy Baxter, Inc.,
clearly shows that it was the intended victim and was directly within the target area,
even though his injury was transferred through an intermediary.
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that requires a commercially competitive relationship to the affected
market or economic sector," it would seem improbable that the courts
would find that the plaintiffs, though injured by the defendants' illegal
activity, were within the directly jeopardized economic sector. Thus
located in the peripheral "fall-out" area, their injury would be remote
and indirect."
However, if the courts decide not to remain bound by judicial
allegiance to the traditional "by reason of" glosses and responses to
injuries alleged under section 4," but instead choose to explore statu-
tory purpose and policy exclusively in light of these particular allega-
tions of injury, then the complainants In re Motor Vehicle Pollution
could be successful despite the novelty of injury and diversity of com-
plainants. In Radovich v. National Football League" the Court held:
Petitioner's claim need only be "tested under the Sherman
Act's general prohibition on unreasonable restraints of trade"
. . . and meet the requirement that petitioner has suffered
injury thereby. Congress has, by legislative fiat, determined
that such prohibited activities are injurious to the public and
has provided sanctions allowing private enforcement of the
antitrust laws by an aggrieved party . . . . In the face of such
a policy this Court should not add requirements to burden
the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by
Congress in these laws. (Emphasis added.)"'
Thus, although the Supreme Court has never ruled specifically upon
the touchstone of directness of injury, its language strongly suggests
that the only requirements for standing to sue under section 4 are
proof of an antitrust violation and of an injury by reason of the viola-
tion." Although application of the "directness" litmus may have occa-
57 See note 53 supra.
58 See note 48 supra.
58 See note 45 supra.
60 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
81 Id. at 453-54.
62 In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660
(1961), the Court held:
Congress having thus prescribed the criteria of the prohibition, the courts may
not expand them. Therefore, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
under that section, allegations adequate to show a violation and, in a private
treble damage action, that plaintiff was damaged thereby are all the law requires.
See also Mandeville Farmers, Inc, v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948):
The statute does not confine its prohibition to consumers, or to purchasers, or to
competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts because they
are done by any of these .... The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage,
protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever
they may be perpetrated. (Emphasis added.)
For a succinctly articulated alternative to anachronistic talismans, see Note, 64 Colum. L.
Rev. 570, 585-88 (1964):
To ask whether the plaintiff was "directly injured" is to ask the wrong question;
what the court should ask is whether the plaintiff (1) is, himself, within the
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sionally precluded a claim that was fraudulent or absurdly speculative,
it is submitted that too often this device has been arbitrarily employed
to avoid proper fact analysis. The plaintiff should be afforded the pre-
sumptive right of action, unless his claim would be conspicuously
opposed to the purpose of the statute and the intent of Congress. The
courts should be alert to causes of action which are specious or which
would allow unconscionable windfalls, but they should not permit
this consideration to obscure the recognition of the private litigant's
broadly defined right of action under section 4. Ironically, under the
judicial gloss of "directness of injury," the party who receives the
windfall is the defendant if the plaintiff is not in privity or in the
economic target area. Recovery thus becomes predicated upon how the
plaintiff chooses to do his business and what degree of commercial
relationship he has to the affected economic market. Hopefully the
courts in the instant case will construe the "by reason of" requirement
to find the allegations of injury sufficient to permit a jury determina-
tion. Should the jury then find for the plaintiffs and award treble
damages, Section 4 of the Clayton Act would be infused with un-
precedented viability in affording private parties economic protection
and judicial remedy. Yet, in the final analysis, such anticipated success
itself would be clothed in irony since it would be a clear demonstration
of congressional failure to perceive or concede that antitrust violations
could inflict injury upon entities of considerably greater value than
business or property.
NICHOLAS K. FOWLER
class of persons entitled to protection and (2) alleges an injury of the type the
statute was intended to guard against. The evident purposes of § 4 are the self-
enforcement of the antitrust laws, the deterrent effect of possible treble liability,
and the compensation of persons injured by violations, Its purpose is so broad
and its mandate so clear that any person who can show damage prima fade
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